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 Recent scholarship has highlighted the affinity between autofiction—a development in 
the contemporary novel that incorporates a fictionalized version of the author in the work—and 
the neoliberal economy. Through readings of contemporary autofictional novels by Nicole 
Krauss and Sheila Heti, this essay argues that autofiction—in addition to being a method by 
which the author can respond to the injunction to develop his or her own portfolio of human 
capital—is a form that interrogates the animating logics behind the contemporary subject of 
capital. Heti’s How Should a Person Be? (2010) dramatizes the formation of the artist as 
neoliberal subject as the adoption of enterprise unification of purpose in order to function within 
the competitive field. Motherhood (2018) describes a writer in her late thirties who stages a 
confrontation between the cultural directive to have children and the demands of a subjectivity 
marked by the injunction to achieve continuous progress, even when none is available. Krauss’s 
Forest Dark. (2017) turns the critical lens back onto autofiction itself, pairing alternating 
narratives that coalesce to form a critique of autofiction’s ambiguous capacity to alter the 
author’s public image. All three novels conclude with an ambivalence toward the continual 
making of self that lies at the heart of both the subject of late capitalism and the autofictional 
gesture, and in so doing, reject the ubiquity of growth narratives in favor of a depiction of self-
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Autofiction’s Interrogation of Neoliberal Subjectivity 
Introduction: the subject of neoliberal capital writes 
Literary studies’ continuing interest in neoliberalism arises from its status as a 
hegemonic, yet largely invisible, ideological framework of subjectivity.1 “Neoliberalism” refers 
to the economic theories associated with Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics 
that first entered the discourse of state economic planning in the 1970’s. The governmental 
policy recommendations neoliberal economic theory generates—privatization of public 
concerns, the reduction of the welfare state to a bare minimum, the lowering of taxes on 
corporate profits—have gone transnational, becoming the favored model of economic planning 
forwarded by bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF2. Political theorist Wendy Brown, in 
Undoing the Demos (2015), defines neoliberalism not only as a program of installing hands-off 
economic planning, but also as “a peculiar form of reason that configures all aspects of existence 
in economic terms” (17). Developing Michel Foucault’s formulation of homo economicus from 
The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), Brown argues that “neoliberalism has taken deeper root in 
subjects and in language, in ordinary practices and in consciousness” than what is immediately 
apparent (47). “Foucault would remind us,” Brown writes, “that any ascendant political 
rationality is not only destructive, but brings new subjects, conduct, relations, and worlds into 
being” (36). In this view, the individual subject, caught in a cultural imaginary that sees 
competition as the essential model of relationality among agents, is figured as its own enterprise. 
 
1 For recent in-depth treatments neoliberalism’s relationship with literature, see the 
special issue of Novel on “The Novel and Neoliberalism” (2018), the special issue of 
Social Text on “Genres of Neoliberalism” (2013), and Affect and American Literature in 
the Age of Neoliberalism by Rachel Greenwald Smith. 
2 See David Harvey’s Brief History of Neoliberalism for the classic account of 
neoliberalism’s global rise. Harvey has it that this suite of policies backed by an 
intensification of classical liberalism was seized upon in a loosely coordinated “project to 
achieve the restoration of class power” (16). 
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As a result, the neoliberal subject, “being for himself his own capital, [...] his own producer, the 
source of earnings,” is alienated from its status as labor or agent of exchange, making room for 
the entrepreneurial mode to occupy a greater and greater share of its activity (Foucault 226). The 
subject of neoliberal capital, besieged on all sides by rivals, must become finely attuned to 
changes in the marketplace and consumer sentiment, turning the search for a profitable niche into 
the work of a lifetime. Successful human capital fully adheres to a program of self-management 
in which subjects measure their performance, focus on their most profitable activities, then 
reinvest their profits in either expanding productive capacity or undertaking a regimen of 
“continuous improvement” to produce regular “breakthroughs” in competitiveness (Juran).3  
As Brown notes, though the above “neoliberal rationality disseminates market values and 
metrics to new spheres, this does not always take a monetary form; rather, fields, persons, and 
practices are economized in ways that vastly exceed literal wealth generation” (37). In the 
societies where it has been most internalized, neoliberal logic is virtually impossible to escape, 
and “the normative reign of homo oeconomicus in every sphere means that there are no 
motivations, drives, or aspirations apart from economic ones” (44). Consider that 
Human capital’s constant and ubiquitous aim, whether studying, interning, 
working, planning retirement, or reinventing itself in a new life, is to 
entrepreneurialize its endeavors, appreciate its value, and increase its rating or 
ranking. In this, it mirrors the mandate for contemporary firms, countries, 
academic departments or journals, universities, media or websites: 
 
3 Juran, the company founded by Romanian-American engineer and consultant Joseph 
M. Juran (1926-2008), lucidly explicates and systemizes one widely-utilized “enterprise 
logic.” Juran works with clients to install a system of “Total Quality Management,” in 
which every employee in a company takes responsibility for quality, defined in this case 
as those attributes of a company’s products or services which increases customer 
satisfaction without decreasing customer satisfaction.   
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entrepreneurialize, enhance competitive positioning and value, maximize ratings 
or rankings (Brown 36). 
Just as the goal for the capital venture is continuous growth, progression becomes the rationale 
for all activity, regardless of the nature of the agent. However, just because the logic is economic 
logic, and the figuration of the subject is homologized with a model of capital enterprise, doesn’t 
mean that the content is strictly financial. As Jason Read argues, “Neoliberalism can be 
considered a particular version of ‘capitalism without capitalism,’” capable of “doing away with 
the antagonism and social insecurity of capitalism […] paradoxically by extending capitalism, at 
least its symbols, terms, and logic, to all of society” (32). Any prior “opposition between 
capitalist and worker has been effaced not by a transformation of the mode of production […] but 
by the mode of subjection, a new production of subjectivity” in which all are united in their 
fanatical pursuit of particular interests (Read 32).  
 Art, then, would be by necessity implicated in this neoliberal governmentality, and as I’ll 
demonstrate, autofiction, a practice of novel writing that includes the insertion of a character 
based-on and named-for the work’s author in the narrative, is the development in contemporary 
fiction that most incorporates the neoliberal model of subjectivity in the content of the work. In 
Nicole Krauss’s Forest Dark (2017), a writer named “Nicole” travels to Israel to gain inspiration 
for her next novel but is soon asked by a retired Mossad agent to finish a play by Franz Kafka so 
that it may be shot as a film—all for the glorification of the Jewish diaspora and the Israeli state. 
Sheila Heti’s first novel, How Should a Person Be? (2012), centers on a young writer in her 
twenties named “Sheila” who struggles with her inability to fulfill an agreement to write a play 
for a local theater company, finding that she needs to first master the art of being a “whole” 
person before she is able to write. In Heti’s 2018 follow-up, Motherhood, a similarly 
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autobiographical author-character weighs, in her late thirties, the decision of whether or not to 
become a mother. In all three of the above instances of autofiction, the authors fulfill the 
neoliberal edict to develop their personal brands by centering a fictionalized version of 
themselves in the work. Additionally, the logic of the neoliberal subject-as-enterprise plays out 
in all its excruciating consequentiality within the novels themselves. “Nicole” in Forest Dark 
concludes that the story of the Jewish people, concerned as it is with reaching a Zionist end, can 
never be realized through writing, “as literature resides in the sphere of the endless, and those 
who write have no hope of an end” (269). Instead, she must write only for herself. “Sheila” in 
How Should a Person Be? learns to discard “unprofitable” activities (striving to become the ideal 
sex object, writing plays about others), and instead pursues a “platonic wholeness” of life fully 
geared towards the production of novels of artistic merit. The unnamed writer in Motherhood 
ultimately decides against becoming a mother, spiraling into an ever-heightening crisis of 
questioning her chosen role as a “writer” before anticlimactically finding peace through 
psychiatric treatment for depression.  
The increase in “life-writing, memoir fiction,” or as it's now commonly identified, 
autofiction, has been described as “[t]he most visible tendency in the contemporary novel right 
now” (Huber 185). As a moment in the history of the novel, autofiction is a development that 
reflects and addresses the economized subject of neoliberalism described by Brown as it directly 
concerns the transplantation of the economic subject’s role in the competitive marketplace into 
the individual subject’s role in private life. Neoliberalism blurs the line between these two 
spheres, always pursuing a full alignment of activity towards one purpose. Autofiction is able to 
accommodate this full alignment by allowing for the direct conversion of “life lived” into 
“fiction sold.” By centering the author-character as an object of direct, authorial manipulation, 
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autofiction becomes a means by which authors can adhere to the injunction to take control of 
their own brand, develop themselves as a venture, and maximize returns. Lee Konstantinou, in a 
roundtable discussion on “Contemporary Autofiction” at the 2021 MLA Convention, argues that 
autofiction is “a way of grappling formally” with the “becoming institutional of the individual.” 
As works of autofiction commonly depict fictionalized author-characters in conflict with the 
process of writing, marketing, or selling their works, authors are able to “foregroun[d] [the] 
struggle to capitalize on [their] own names.” For Konstantinou, this means that “the distinctive 
feature of this aesthetic gesture [autofiction] is the internalization of marketing into literary 
form,” making it something more akin to “Reality Television than metafiction.”  
The close affinity of autofiction and the increasingly urgent demands placed on the 
neoliberal subject to develop itself as a matter of absolute priority is clear. But an understanding 
of autofiction as mostly marketing is in danger of understating the significant need for a mode of 
art that concerns itself with the interrogation of neoliberal subjectivity in all its complexity. 
Comparisons of autofiction with reality television—while apt in highlighting both forms’ 
collapsing of the fact/fiction divide and their shared utility in advancing one’s position and 
exposure in one’s respective competitive field—discount the political ramifications of 
autofiction’s unique generic/modal properties, properties that are not at all present in reality 
television. Autofiction combines the role of critic with the role of author of fiction, and the 
author/characters that populate these works continuously question their own activities and 
experience the careerist obligations of their professions as sources of anxiety and ennui. Reality 
television shows rarely, if ever, allow their stars to express discontent with the show.  
In what follows, I’ll argue that autofiction’s capacity to make available neoliberal 
subjectivity as a legible object of critique allows it to serve as a diagnostic for the contemporary 
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reader. Further, I’ll show how the works of autofiction read—Krauss’s Forest Dark and Heti’s 
HSAPB? and Motherhood— make important, critical revelations of neoliberal subjectivity that 
other forms would struggle to illuminate. Namely, the three works reveal the lived, material 
ramifications of a neoliberal subject that has mutated in response to an economic moment in 
which the animating principle of enterprise—the reinvestment of profit into growth—becomes 
unavailable as anything but an empty structure, resulting in a dynamic in which the subject, 
unable to make progress towards any attainable goal, gets caught in a recursive loop of receding 
from, and then reproducing, its own identity.  
The competing genealogies of contemporary autofiction 
While “autofiction” has gained purchase as a term of art in the world of book reviews for 
over the past decade or more, the publication of some of the first extended academic studies on 
autofiction’s contemporary manifestation has occurred in just the past few years. The Hywel 
Dix-edited collection, Autofiction in English, and Marjory Worthington’s monograph, The Story 
of “Me”: Contemporary American Autofiction, both published in 2018, are in part concerned 
with the establishment of an origin story that explains the increase in the publication—or 
identification—of novels categorized as autofiction. Dix’s introduction to Autofiction in English 
makes the now-familiar genealogical move of tracing the genre’s origins to 1970’s France when 
Serge Doubrovsky coined the term “autofiction” in a blurb that appeared on the back of his own 
heavily autobiographical novel, Fils (1977) (“Introduction” 1). In Dix’s retelling, “it was [...] on 
a stylistic basis that [Doubrovsky] first attempted to define” autofiction, describing “the practice” 
as one “committed to narrating events that he considered strictly real” outside of any adherence 
to the “linear, sequential, chronological time” in which they may have initially been experienced 
(“Introduction” 2). As Doubrovsky’s practice gained critical attention in France, his definition of 
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autofiction shifted to a “sociological” account of the position of the author (3). In this view, a 
would-be writer of autobiography must be “sufficiently well known to the general public” or “of 
a sufficiently high standing even within the more limited sphere of the reading public to warrant” 
such a designation (3). Doubrovsky’s revised definition understood autofiction as “a form of 
autobiographical writing that offers to fill the gap created when more traditional forms of 
autobiography are rendered sociologically unavailable by the status of the writer (which may of 
course be ‘real’ or perceived)” (3). In this sense, autofiction is what happens when autobiography 
is written by “nobodies” (3). If the key differentiator of autofiction from autobiography is that it 
often “incorporates the techniques and characteristics more commonly associated with fiction, 
especially modernist experimental fiction,” its ability to make a “truth-claim” in keeping with 
Phillippe Lejeune’s “autobiographical pact” struck between reader and writer of an ostensibly 
nonfiction text is removed (Late Career Novelist 160). Thus, the works, though based on one’s 
lived experiences, are more honestly described by the word “novel” than autobiography or 
memoir, producing the genre of autofiction to fill that space. In Dix’s account of the genre, 
recent academic interest “in research about life writing” in the anglophone context prompted 
scholars to plumb the archives of a rich, French critical engagement with the large body of 
French autofiction, allowing “the field of autofiction to” come to its “moment of effective 
emergence in English in both theory and practice” that we see today (7). 
In the Story of Me, Worthington develops a definition of autofiction in which it is only 
the term “autofiction” that can trace an etymological lineage to France, while the form and 
content of the novels being discussed and read today in the US are firmly rooted in the 
metafictional tendency that emerged in American postmodern literature. This genealogical 
distinction allows Worthington to assert that the “defining characteristic of autofiction” is that 
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the author of a work and their namesake author-character that appears in a work “become 
divergent yet metaleptically interconnected entities” in the course of depicting fictional events 
(2). This results in a text that, made clear first and foremost through paratextual cues, “is meant 
to be read primarily as a novel,” while “autobiography or memoir is meant to be read as a true 
story” (3). American novels from the post-war period that first flirted with the idea of including a 
character sharing the same name as the author—Worthington points to Kurt Vonnegut’s 
appearance in Slaughterhouse Five (1969), and John Barth’s authorial intrusions in his short 
story collection Lost in the Funhouse (1968) as examples—would represent the true genetic 
forebears of contemporary autofiction. These works often feature “the self-conscious insertion 
into fiction of a male authorial figure who tries, often unsuccessfully, to gain and keep control of 
his narrative,” which often stubbornly insists on its autonomy despite the author’s best efforts 
(Worthington 45). These metafictional gestures respond to a historical moment in which the 
status of white men “as the universal and objective societal ‘norm,’” and the concomitant 
possibility for a white male writer to assume a “disembodied authorial authority” over any 
narrative, becomes increasingly untenable (51). Therefore, “called upon to reveal their 
positionality,” white male authors utilize the “autofictional approach” with the paradoxical result 
of “recenter[ing] white masculinity” (51, 48).  
If a writer ‘enters’ his novel as a character, claiming that he has lost or is losing 
control over that narrative, not only does he make himself (or at least, a 
characterized version of himself) the thematic venter (protagonist) of the novel, 
but he also foregrounds his creative powers by reasserting his authorial power 
within the pages of that novel. Autofiction thus recenters the decentered figure of 
the wounded white male author figure” (48).   
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This view, which comes to see autofiction as a “symptom of authorial anxieties that stemmed 
from the literary gains made by women and writers of color and the declining cultural capital of 
the traditional figure of the author” allows Worthington to see the genre “as a largely white male 
endeavor” (“We’ll Make Magic” 8). Therefore, the “unsparingly truthful, often psychoanalytic 
explorations of a writer’s selfhood” that most resemble the works coming out of the autofiction 
movement arising in 1970’s France “would likely be termed ‘memoirs’ rather than 
‘autofictions’” within the “American literary context” (“We’ll Make Magic” 4). While 
Worthington recognizes that authors who identify differently certainly write autofiction, it is the 
practice maintained by and for the purposes of white men she centers in her critique of the genre.   
According to novelist Tope Folarin, however, the publishing industry as a whole has 
failed to recognize the extent to which autofiction is written by people of color, suggesting that 
Worthington’s critique of autofiction as primarily a gesture by white men responding to their 
decentering by historical circumstances may be less a generic feature than a tendency of a 
particular demographic. Folarin, whose autofictional novel A Particular Kind of Black Man came 
out in 2019, wrote in October 2020 that authors of color who write novels that are formalistically 
identical to autofiction—including “Man Gone Down by Michael Thomas, The Residue Years by 
Mitchell Jackson, What We Lose by Zinzi Clemmons, [...] Freshwater by Akwaeke Emezi,” and 
his own novel—are rarely, if ever, described as being writers of autofiction. Instead, “when the 
autobiographical content of these novels is addressed it is simply described as being, well, 
autobiographical” (Folarin). Since autofiction is perceived to be “at the cutting edge of literary 
innovation” while “autobiographical fiction is as old as time,” these writers of color are left out 
of the lively discourse surrounding an emerging form. The consistent citation of white writers as 
examples of authors of autofiction is all the more alarming since autofiction “is not a literary 
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movement—or at the very least [...] autofiction’s practitioners have not indicated they are 
working together or issued some earnest manifesto declaring their intentions to the world”—but 
a category “created by critics, which perhaps explains why this genre’s generally acknowledged 
membership is so homogenous” (Folarin). Folarin notes that officially-designated “autofiction 
writers benefit from an ongoing, ever-recurring conversation about their work that constantly 
probes and redefines what they have accomplished and extends the lifecycle of their work 
beyond the typical book promotional time frame.” This critical attention on “The Offices of Cusk 
Heti Lerner & Knausgaard,” Folarin’s joke that the combined names of autofiction’s most cited 
authors in their combined form creates the impression that they’re “partners in a kind of literary 
professional services firm,” gives them the material benefit of lingering sales while Black (and 
other marginalized) writers are not welcome to the lucrative club of the avant garde. 
Notable in Folarin’s critique that autofiction’s critically-imposed homogeneity produces 
unfair sales advantages for white writers is how it centers on the marketing power contained in a 
term like “autofiction.” Autofiction’s novelty certainly contributes to its ability to attract critical 
attention, but it is autofiction’s ability to meet the market-based demand that authors separate 
themselves in a field of literary competition that informs Christian Lorentzen’s critique of 
autofiction as a symptom of contemporary “careerism” (“Vying Animal”). For Lorentzen, 
careerism has become “the dominant literary style in America,” and constitutes a ceaseless 
activity that goes “above and beyond the usual” business obligations for writers such as 
“dealings with editors, agents, and Hollywood big shots.” Examples of careerism include 
“[i]nstitutional jockeying, posturing in profiles and Q&As, roving in-person readership 
cultivation, social-media fan-mongering, coming off as a good literary citizen among one’s 
peers,” and all other activities that professional writers must perform as “a matter of necessity 
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and survival” in the field of competition. In Lorentzen’s view, when an author’s writing itself is 
recruited in the service of fulfilling the careerist injunction to craft and “idealize their fictional 
selves,” that is, to self-brand, an “autofiction of self-flattery” can result (“Vying Animal”). 
Lorentzen’s description of the incessant self-development demanded of the contemporary author 
elucidates, and his identification of autofiction as a possible outlet for meeting such demands, 
elucidates many of the salient features of autofiction that make it so amenable to recruitment in 
careerist efforts. These are the same features that Konstantinou and I center in analyzing 
autofiction’s formal responsiveness to the unique demands placed on the subject under 
capitalism’s late, neoliberal form.   
For Konstantinou, “autofiction, [...] at least in its contemporary variation, is not a genre” 
in the strictest sense, but “an aesthetic gesture or practice or mode [...] that takes place at the 
intersection of genre and marketing.” Autofiction, then, represents “a way of grappling formally 
with a larger ongoing historical condition or crisis”—neoliberalism—under which “the 
individual is increasingly charged with the job of managing his own portfolio of human capital” 
(Konstantinou). Therefore the “internalization of marketing into literary form, and the 
identification of self-promotion with the author function” begets the rise of a practice of writing 
which can unite the artistic impulse with the neoliberal injunction to stand out in the field of 
competition (Konstantinou). Neoliberal subjects, treated as entrepreneurs of themselves, are 
under the consistent pressure to individuate and take control of their own identities as yet another 
text to be authored. While this may be done by any number of methods, authors find in 
autofiction the opportunity to center their own fictionalized avatars in their works, giving them 
control over what Wayne Booth calls the “Career Author,” the “author-image evoked by a work 
and constituted by the stylistic, ideological, and aesthetic properties for which indexical signs 
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can be found in the text” (Schmid). The career-author image, conjured by each individual reader, 
functions as a signal of what features to expect in a new, unread work, contributing to readerly 
impressions of which authors he or she “likes.” In this way, the career-author image, especially 
when steered purposely in a work of autofiction, can function like a corporate brand, purposely 
fashioning a body of aesthetic features that appeal to certain demographics. Autofiction allows 
the author to apply their craft directly to shaping the effect produced by the paratextual 
appearance of their name on the cover of a book, even in subsequent, non-autofictional works.  
In his article “Everything and Less: Fiction in the Age of Amazon,” Mark McGurl’s 
analysis of the author in the age of the service economy provides another promising avenue by 
which autofiction’s status as a practice of neoliberal subjectivity can be understood. In the “Age 
of Amazon,” fiction writers have learned to self-figure as enterprises in the model of the post-
Fordist, service-sector dominated economy, an epochal development in relationality between 
provider and consumer that “comes freighted with a complex social psychology of servility and 
entitlement, servility and domination, and indeed servile domination” (Hochschild qtd. in 
McGurl 453). McGurl argues that the contemporary author’s sensitivity to the market demands a 
highly flexible producer, one who responds to shifts in consumer sentiment in “real time.” While 
the author strives for instantaneous reaction to consumer demand, McGurl’s study reveals the 
recent historical development of an imaginary that locates literature as precisely the site in which 
a subject can effect the temporary abatement of the perpetual march of “real-time” experience. 
McGurl argues that “what makes fiction so interesting as a ‘neoliberal’ commodity is its partial 
temporal disjunction from the real-time regime” as it has come to constitute “the virtualization of 
quality time” (465). Fiction, “consumed during alone time, [...] finds its thematic substance in the 
narrative dilation of human intimacy and intrigue, while its most typical grammatical form—the 
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past tense—indicates its imaginary removal from the real time of the reader’s present” (McGurl 
465). This makes it capable of “carving out spaces for autonomous sociality as against the 
relentless demands of work” (465). “The task” for the writer, then, becomes “to stay in the 
moment—forever,” a project that mirrors Amazon’s mission of always staying one step ahead of 
changes in consumption habits (perhaps by shaping them itself) (467). If somehow the 
paradoxical simultaneity of “[r]eal time and long term [...] is exactly the formula for enduring 
literary value,” then we can surmise that autofiction is the genre that most happily marries the 
“now” with the forever. While McGurl makes no mention of autofiction directly, it represents the 
development in the novel most formally suited to achieving the direct transubstantiation of 
fleeting, real-time experience into the concretized form of “the literary text,” which “can now in 
theory live forever, for as long at least as humanity does, or its servers” (469). One side-effect, 
perhaps, is that a logic which orients the aggregate intentionality of “life” towards whatever 
textual production can be made of it creates a pressure-system in which “life will be meaningful 
only insofar as the work” that results “remains available as an object of experience, an occasion 
for the real-time enjoyment of virtual quality time, that is, for reading” (469). The writer of 
autofiction, then, must retain the paranoid awareness that every decision taken, and every move 
made in their real life, while available for fictional manipulation, has some extra-experiential 
responsibility to some reader “out there.” The application of McGurl’s framework to autofiction 
results in the revelation of a subject of neoliberalism who, paradoxically, living only for its own 
interests and its own development (the historical paragon of narcissism), must in fact recruit 
every ounce of its subjectivity in a stance of permanent servility towards the customer.  
Perhaps the expansion of servility, called up by neoliberal subjectivity as structured by 
the service economy, is why there is such a clear tendency among contemporary authors of 
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autofiction to center a fictionalization of their careers as at least one of the anchoring plot 
conceits of their novels, a feature shared by Krauss’s Forest Dark and Heti’s HSAPB? and 
Motherhood. As Konstantinou notes, “contemporary autofiction, from Dave Eggers to Ben 
Lerner to Sheila Heti to Rachel Cusk,” exhibits an “obsess[ion] with the process of publishing 
and the mechanics of the writer’s life.” This is due to the fact that “under neoliberalism, the 
individual” author “becomes something like a firm, who must: on the one hand, manage his own 
inner resources, his drives, his talents, and so on, and then, on the other hand, must, like any 
independent firm, hire and fire agents, editors, and publishers and must navigate personal and 
professional relationships that will, in time, get absorbed back into the maw of his writing” 
(Konstantinou). The careerist dimension of the autofictionalist’s life is clearly legible in the work 
itself, but what’s perhaps worth noting at this point is how those activities that most explicitly 
deal in marketing and achieving competitiveness, in so many cases, is presented as a source of 
pain, frustration, and ennui in the writer’s life. The neoliberal careerist injunction seems to clash 
with cultural narratives that animate the author’s decision to pursue literary life in the first place, 
inciting feelings of ambivalence and guilt. Literary criticism’s abiding interest in literature’s 
capture by—versus the availability of modes of resistance to—neoliberalism is especially 
pertinent given the way that works of autofiction often stage the neoliberal subject’s “grappling” 
with its own understanding of its activity.  
Aaron Colton, a scholar interested in representations of writer’s block “in postwar US 
literary culture,” stages a confrontation of many of the different views of the extent of 
neoliberalism’s capture of literature in his reading of Sheila Heti’s How Should a Person Be? 
(497). Colton, like McGurl, does not discuss autofiction directly, but instead sees HSAPB? 
primarily as a “New Sincerity” text that follows in the example set by David Foster Wallace in 
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his manifesto-like essay “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction” (469). In Colton’s 
view, HSPAB? and other works of New Sincerity, which consciously turn away from the 
depersonalized irony associated with postmodernism, offer “a powerful method for contesting 
the preeminence of neoliberalism” by “animating personal feelings” and paying a “characteristic 
attention to expressive dilemmas” that “grants writers access to a register of epistemic critique 
which neoliberalism otherwise renders unavailable” (471). Specifically, he argues, Heti’s 
deployment of the “künstlerroman” —a version of bildungsroman in which the development of 
an artist is traced—“become[s] a vehicle for interrogating constraints on expression, refusing 
responsibilization, and dethroning neoliberalism as the only conceivable rationale” (472). 
Colton’s reading offers a rebuttal of sorts to Rachel Greenwald Smith, as her critique of 
the “affective hypothesis,” a critical framework built on “the belief that literature is at its most 
meaningful when it represents and transmits the emotional specificity of personal experience” 
would necessarily implicate New Sincerity as a movement (Smith 1). In Affect and American 
Literature in the Age of Neoliberalism (2015), Smith argues that the affective hypothesis 
represents a key interpretive trope of a disordered cultural logic that “imagines the act of reading 
as an opportunity for emotional investment and return” within the same neoliberal framework 
that “imagines the individual as an entrepreneur” (2). In this distinctly neoliberal imaginary of 
art, the affective contents of literature highlighted in the “affective hypothesis” are only those 
which Smith calls “personal feelings”: feelings which “function like private property” not in that 
“they are secret or interior,” but in that they are “‘privatized’” (2). Personal feelings appearing in 
literature “circulate outside the self” in a manner akin to copyrighted intellectual property, 
“enrich[ing] the individual through their carefully calculated development, distribution, and 
expansion” (2). As an alternative, Smith offers that the cultivation of a literature of “impersonal 
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feelings”—which, for example, might use formal innovation to “emphasize the materiality of 
language” rather than “give weight to sentimental connections” or employ techniques to achieve 
“distance” from the personal rather than an “immediacy” with feeling—could be used to 
decommodify feelings in an effort that restores a figuration of “affect [...] as a commons” (58). 
Though Colton agrees with Smith’s base-level assumptions about the pervasiveness of 
neoliberalism as a mode of subjectivity, he argues that “the personal/impersonal feelings 
dichotomy” imposed on contemporary literature by Smith’s critique “also prompts us to reject 
literatures that, although rife with personal feelings, nonetheless offer responses to neoliberalism 
worthy of critical evaluation” (471). It is possible, in other words, to use an exploration of one’s 
personal experiences and feelings to effectively “write against” neoliberalism.  
In reading Forest Dark, HSAPB?, and Motherhood, I hope to demonstrate that 
autofiction’s reactivity with the prevailing model of subjectivity is unique among literary forms 
because of the multivalence of its connection with neoliberalism. Autofiction serves the 
neoliberal, careerist interests of the author while simultaneously offering a fictionalized, textual 
representation of that subjectivity as a legible object of critique for both author and reader to 
consider. Unlike reality television, which merely reifies the understanding that life is an endless 
competition in which the subject eagerly partakes, Krauss’s and Heti’s autofictions depict 
subjectivities defined by a persistence of crisis. These novels show us crisis as inherent to that 
structure. Neoliberalism makes progress a condition of subjectivity, a condition that by definition 
is impossible to live up to. The incessant careerism identified by Lorentzen as a condition for 
survival becomes one of just many examples that autofiction shows us of how the progress-
seeking subject is fate exist  
“I don’t think they even know the rules;” learning to compete in How Should a Person Be? 
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In Sheila Heti’s two autofictional novels, How Should a Person Be? (2012) and 
Motherhood (2018), author-characters self-consciously wrestle with the implications of adopting 
the moniker “writer,” an identity that both describes a model of individual enterprise while 
simultaneously hosting a multiplicity of cultural meanings and connotations. As both works are 
organized around the answering of a question as the proposed intradiegetic justification for their 
writing, as they share the development of similar themes, and as they both include the adoption 
of mechanical invention devices that introduce extra-ideological decision-making apparatuses, 
Heti’s pair of novels invite being read in tandem. Adherence to Heti’s real-life career arc also 
suggests a paired reading. Sheila, the author-character/narrator of How Should a Person Be? in 
her twenties, struggles to carve out an individuated identity for herself among a milieu of artists 
in Toronto, eventually developing herself into a highly transparent version of “writer” that is 
essentially purpose-built for the production of autofiction. Motherhood, like an unasked-for 
sequel that immediately rolls post-credits after an ostensibly happy ending, throws a wrench into 
the future projected by its predecessor. Instead, Motherhood depicts an unnamed writer in her 
late thirties living with the consequences of a dedication to maintaining the “writer” identity 
adopted at the end of HSAPB?. Finding not a “happily ever-after,” but a life occupied with 
frenetic activity necessitated by merely remaining a writer, this author-character (whom I’ll call 
“Heti” in order to differentiate her from both Sheila, the name of the author-character of 
HSAPB?, and the real life Heti) suddenly finds herself confronted with the demands of another, 
conflicting cultural narrative: the inseparability of motherhood and womanhood.  
As I’ll argue, Heti’s autofictions are not limited to a cynically fulfilling the “marketing” 
function identified by Konstantinou. Instead, Heti’s novels demonstrate autofiction’s capacity to 
make the subject of human capital under neoliberalism a legible object of critique that other 
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forms often reify by turning that logic into plot. By critically engaging the adoption of a 
“perfected” neoliberal subjectivity as described by Wendy Brown in HSPAB?, which is then 
systematically revealed as incoherent, destabilizing, and unfulfilling in Motherhood, Heti’s work 
is able to pierce the screen that allows for the unquestioned pursuit of self-enterprise. In so doing, 
the application of the logic of capital venture—a logic that requires the subject to achieve 
continuous growth, development, or progression as well as a deep identification with one’s 
“enterprise model” as an all-encompassing identity formation—to all spheres of activity in order 
to survive in a competitive field is demonstrated as a force that renders the stable maintenance of 
identity nearly impossible. As “Heti” in Motherhood continuously finds herself receding from a 
steady belief in herself as a writer, her struggle to retain a comfortable identification with what 
she certainly already is becomes the main source of conflict in her life. In Motherhood, “Heti’s” 
ruminative, recursive inner conflict, animated by the impossibility of fulfilling the neoliberal 
injunction to achieve continuous progress, is resolved anticlimactically by psychiatric 
intervention near the end of the novel. In this way, Heti’s autofiction reveals an important aspect 
of neoliberal subjectivity that even Brown’s groundbreaking work and other studies of workers 
in the “new economy” do not easily address: the incoherence of that subjectivity in an economic 
system in which enterprise-style growth cannot be achieved on a continuous basis by the 
individual. The neoliberal subject as depicted by Heti acts according to a set of instructions that 
renders unresolvable inner conflict a default reality of daily life. 
The real-life experience that, in its rough outlines, correlates to the events depicted in 
HSAPB? happened while Heti was writing her first published book, a short fiction collection 
called The Middle Stories (2001). At the time, she had been struggling with finishing a 
commissioned play, and when the opportunity arose to publish a collection of stories with Dave 
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Eggers’s press, McSweeney’s, it became paramount that she did “what need[ed] to be done to 
get the book written,” including molding herself into “the person” she “need[ed] to be to write 
[the] book” (“First Time”). This process of radical self-reconfiguration into a specific model of 
“writer” has since become an abiding interest of Heti’s, and a repeated trope in her literary 
career. As she says in an interview with The Paris Review, “I like inventing the self that makes 
that book.” Published over ten years after the events that are attributed with inspiring it, HSAPB? 
dispense with the short story collection as a plot point, and instead invents the self that makes the 
autofictional novel. Its main conflict is centered on the figure of an aborted play, but its author-
character “Sheila” sets out in pursuit of a more general answer about “how to be” through a 
myriad of methods. Whether she envies the traits and attributes of others, receives Jungian 
psychoanalysis, or seeks he quiet dignity of competently laboring in a high-end hair salon, every 
avenue comes up empty. The answer that she ultimately comes to is that a person should be 
unified in purpose such that every aspect of his or her subjectivity is oriented towards a certain 
oneness. In Sheila’s case, she attains unity under the enterprise-model of “writer.” HSAPB?, as a 
bildungsroman about coming of age as a neoliberal subject, depicts “Sheila” learning how to 
effectively capitalize on her entire existence, including “all the trash and the shit inside” her 
(277). In so doing, she is figured as the ideal author of the autofiction represented by the novel.  
In HSAPB?, the writer’s block “Sheila” experiences in trying to complete her play is 
never overcome because the actual work required constitutes an experience outside the flow of 
life that ruptures its wholeness or unity of purpose. She repeatedly considers “cancel[ling] the 
play not because it’s dangerous, but because life doesn’t feel like it’s in [her] stupid play, or with 
[her] sitting in a room typing” (HSAPB 82). The problem of a discontinuity of experience pits the 
neoliberal injunction for self-development against the activity of the playwright, who must take 
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time away from the self in order to sit and write, even if that writing constitutes a more directly 
economic activity than a journey of self-development would seem to. But the two activities are 
continuously conflated by Sheila. As she says when considering the appeal of entering an “ugly 
painting competition” with her friends, “I had spent so much time trying to make the play I was 
writing—and my life, and my self—into an object of beauty” that it had become “exhausting and 
all that I knew” (13). Driven to efface the distinction between herself and her play, Sheila is 
frustrated in her attempts to undertake the development of each under the banner of a single 
project aimed at producing a unified “object of beauty” (13). Whether it is a pressure originating 
from the particularities of her art-world community or located in a widely held cultural 
idealization of the artist, the inclusion of aesthetic criteria indicates the displacement of the 
economic content from the neoliberal growth impulse. Sheila’s desire to merge the totality of her 
life experience with the practice of her writing mirrors the neoliberal “model of the subject [...] 
that reconciles the contradictory commitments” inherent in “liberalism, in which individuals 
were shaped on the one hand as citizen-subjects and on the other hand as economic subjects” 
(Smith 5).  It has become a cultural standard, at least in the middle- and upper-classes, that 
individuals “love their work” or “do what they’re passionate about,” creating the idealized life-
image of a professional who “lives their dreams” as the standard bearer of neoliberal 
subjectivity. The ideal subject under neoliberalism then is a venture that unifies all affectivity 
towards a single purpose. It is a true “individual,” impossible to divide. Sheila’s striving for that 
consolidation of purpose is precisely what produces the writer’s block that dooms her play. She 
is unable to integrate her self-image into the “beautiful,” the category in which art objects are 
found.   
Sheila’s interpellation of neoliberal subjectivity, taking on the form of an urgent quest for 
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oneness, becomes troubled by her understanding that “[t]here was something wrong inside” of 
her, “something ugly, which [she] didn’t want anyone to see” (22). This ugliness, if revealed, 
would “contaminate everything [she] would ever do” and belie “the upright, good-inside person 
[she] hoped to show the world” (22). She looks for a way to “correct [her] flightiness, confusion, 
and selfishness,” and “which ever” else “revealed [her] lack of unity inside,” the thing she most 
“despised” about herself (22). This fear of a priori contamination causes her to search for an 
ideal image that she can use to overwrite herself, replacing her ugliness with something new and 
perfect, and in so doing makes a series of missteps that take her further away from achieving 
unity of purpose. She gets married at a young age (“the only way to repair this badness was 
devotion in love,” she thinks), divorces, pursues perfection as a servile sex object with a man 
named (no joke) “Israel,” and moves (briefly) to New York in order to “become important” 
(which would be the “the one thing that would justify the ugliness inside me,” she thinks) (22, 
189). But none of it works. Her marriage becomes a “brick wall” she needs to “punch [her]self 
through” in order to access the freedom of self-determination (44). Her divorce fails to help her 
“return to the play with new vigor,” leaving her absented by the feeling that fate had been 
guiding her decisions (41). Her pursuit of perfection in objectified degradation on behalf of 
“Israel” only adds to her sense of shame when she becomes aware that, in keeping with a request 
to write him a letter “in the style of a letter home from a first-year university student or camper,” 
while baring her vagina to someone at a restaurant “how sick it was that all this time I had been 
having so much trouble writing my play, yet instead of laboring away at it, here I was writing 
this fucking letter—this cock-sucking letter of flattery for Israel!” (205, 222). In all of these 
attempts to achieve unity—to fulfill the neoliberal injunction to orient oneself wholly towards an 
economized model of growth and achievement—she fails to account for her internal ugliness as 
 
22 
an asset to be developed.  
Her persistent mistake in determining how a person should be, illustrated repeatedly 
through these various examples, is that each answer she arrives at, each ideal she pursues, is one 
that produces herself “as an object, or as an image to tend to, or as an icon” (183). “Instead of 
developing the capacities within,” Sheila misidentifies the ontological state required to achieve 
unity by “treating [herself] as [an] object to be admired,” constituting an “attempt to make the 
self into an object of need and desire by tending to the image of” herself (184). She allows 
herself, “in [her] freedom,” to “wan[t] to be like coke to the coke addict, food to the starving 
person, and the middle of the night to thieves” (184). To give a name to it, Sheila repeatedly self-
figures as a commodity, misplaced in a neoliberal economic framework that has undergone the 
“subtle shift from exchange to competition as the essence of the market” (Brown 36). As 
Foucault explains, since “what is sought” by neoliberalism “is not a society subject to the 
commodity effect, but a society subject to the dynamic of competition,” the model of subject or 
“[t]he homo oeconomicus sought after is not the man of exchange or man the consumer” but “the 
man of enterprise and production” (147). Sheila’s attempt to trade on her personal aesthetic 
worth in order to receive validation, however, is essentially an act of exchange. In attempting to 
become the desired commodity, Sheila hopes that she will be determine her worth by 
“establish[ing] the equivalence of two values” via the “free exchange between two partners” 
(Foucault 118). But in neoliberalism, the “most important thing about the market is competition, 
that is to say, not equivalence but on the contrary inequality” (120). Thus, the commodity as 
fetishized by the market cannot stand as the determining analogy for the individual subject under 
neoliberalism, as this subject, like an enterprise, only has value insofar as it can achieve 
continuous progress and demonstrate its superiority over the competition—always in motion, 
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always overcoming. The neoliberal subject relies on the “incorporation of all subjective 
potential, the capacity to communicate, to feel, to create, to think, into productive powers,” in 
other words, the unity that Sheila lacks (Read 33). Sheila, who should be developing her capacity 
to create value, becomes misdirected by the imagined concretization of value found in the 
aesthetic, resulting in the wrong ontological transformation: becoming object rather than subject. 
As she explains,  
…the three ways the art impulse can manifest itself are: as an object, like a 
painting; as a gesture; and as a reproduction, such as a book. When we try to turn 
ourselves into a beautiful object, it is because we mistakenly consider ourselves to 
be an object, when a human being is really the other two: a gesture, and a 
reproduction of the human type (HSAPB?184).  
Establishing a pattern that holds even through Motherhood, Sheila, like the author-
character that succeeds her, often makes progress towards finding the answer to the central 
question of “how a person should be” only in fits and spurts; regression almost always follows. 
Sudden moments of clarity come through in moments of reduced consciousness, such as in 
dreams, or, as in the example above, the hazy aftermath of a period of cyclical heavy drinking 
and cocaine use at night paired with intensely focused but empty work during the day. As a 
result, Sheila only fully internalizes the implications of discovering the fault in her self-
commodification very late in the novel, when, in deciding to end things with Israel, she decides 
to debase herself with such intensity—cuddling up with Israel’s flaccid penis and announcing her 
intention to sleep that way through the night—that the “humiliation brought on [her]self would 
humiliate him, too” (272). Her action successfully ensures that none of “his desire for [her] 
might remain,” and, after watching him silently dress and leave the next morning, she reflects 
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triumphantly that “[w]hat [she] had done in the night [...] felt like the first choice [she] had ever 
made not in the hopes of being admired” (273). That done,  
Now it was time to write. I went straight into my studio and thought about 
everything I had, all the trash and the shit inside me. And I started throwing the 
trash and throwing the shit, and the castle began to emerge. I’d never before 
wanted to uncover all the molecules of shit that were such a part of my deepest 
being which, once released, would smell forever of the shit that I was, and which 
nothing—not exile, not fame—could ever disappear. But I threw the shit and the 
trash and the sand, and for years and years I just threw it. And I began to light up 
my soul with scenes. I made what I could with what I had. And I finally became a 
real girl (277). 
The result of those “years and years” Sheila spends revealing what she once worked tirelessly to 
conceal is implied to consist of the text that forms, at least in part, HSAPB?. Her model of 
“writer,” understood as one of those who “are destined to expose every part of themselves, so the 
rest of us can know what it means to be human,” functions through a radical transparency (60). 
But it also, clearly, is one that orients a unity towards the maximization of inner-resource 
exploitation. Like McGurl’s writer in “The Age of Amazon,” Sheila’s arrived-at construction of 
“writer” sees a life that, in its every “molecule,” even the “shit” ones, becomes meaningful to the 
extent that it produces a worthwhile reading experience. But even in the rough bildungsroman-
adjacent outlines of its character development, HSAPB? does not leave readers with the 
untroubled impression that Sheila’s invention of “the person that would make this book” should 
be taken simply as a figure of triumph.  
Here is where the “Ugly Painting Competition,” undertaken by Sheila’s friends Margaux 
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and Sholem, enters as one of the most important figures in HSAPB?. The proposal of the contest 
and its eventual resolution effectively bookend the novel, and Sheila’s announcement that she 
“wanted to make an ugly painting—pit [hers] against theirs and see whose would win” should be 
taken as an invitation to consider the novel itself as an undeclared entry (13). Most obviously, the 
Ugly Painting Competition is a competition, making clear that the distortion of “art” the idea 
represents is not limited to the uncommon injunction to make ugly, but is charged by its entrance 
into a decidedly neoliberal space of competition. Sholem approaches his entry as an “intellectual 
exercise that he could sort of approach in a cold fashion,” deciding that his method would be to 
“just do everything he hated when his students did it” (13). The result is so visually repulsive that 
he hides the painting away and becomes depressed for weeks. Margaux’s entry, which turns out 
to be “inadvertently beautiful” features a black and yellow “rainbow coming out of a hole with a 
sunrise,” and is titled “Woman Time” (289-290). The vastly different approaches make it 
impossible to choose a winner since each seems to excel according to different criteria. At this 
point, “uneasy” that “no winner had been declared,” the group decide that the criteria for 
determining the winner of the competition would be decided by another competition, a game of 
squash. Sheila and two other friends take their places to observe the match. “The game,” which 
“went very slowly at first, then grew more and more focused,” is depicted with all of the 
intensity of a major tennis tournament (305). However, “[a]fter about half an hour of” of 
increasingly intense gameplay, Sheila and the other spectators realize that they don’t know who 
is winning, so they focus “more intently [on] the game” (306). Eventually, one of them says “‘I 
don’t think they even know the rules. I think they’re just slamming the ball around.’And,” the 
narration confirms, “so they were” (306). Those words, which close the novel, are clearly 
“punched-up” and played for humor. But the ending also suggests that readers ought to consider 
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whether the criteria for selecting a winner in any competitive field could always be determined 
by the result of some other competition, which in turn is itself contingent on the results of yet 
another competition, etc. The recursivity of such a structure produces a circular logic with no 
“bottom,” and Sheila’s hard-won entry into the competitive field, the “ugly painting” that is the 
novel she produces by learning to capitalize on herself completely and achieving a unity of 
purpose, is suddenly revealed to be merely the buy-in to a pyramid scheme with nothing 
propping it up outside of an endlessly iterative and meaningless competitive algorithm. The 
narrative structure of the novel, in which self-development leads to self-actualization as a writer 
of autofiction, is finally undermined. This brief complicating moment reveals that Sheila’s 
bildungsroman to achieve unity of existence is not the narrative telos initially suggested, an 
insight that, like so many in the two novels, is only fully explored much later as we see the 
author-character of Motherhood become mired in that same endless recursivity.   
Motherhood: writing on the ‘identity treadmill’  
 By the time we catch up with the author-character of Heti’s Motherhood (2018), we find 
a well-known writer in her late thirties who makes a book project out of deciding whether or not 
to become a mother. Reviews of the novel have focused, understandably, on this central conceit; 
the question of motherhood is the driving force of the novel and “Heti’s” conclusion—to not 
have a child—represents a notable departure from most of the body of work that thematizes the 
subject. “In all the literature about motherhood,” writes Guardian reviewer Lara Feigel, “there 
remains very little about voluntary childlessness” (Feigel). Reviews have not failed to take note 
of the other thread running throughout its pages—that of “Heti’s” uneasy relationship with her 
identity. While the future-oriented question of whether or not to have a child weighs heavily on 
the mind of Heti’s narrator, “[t]he biggest presence in her life,” as seen in the contemporary 
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timeline of the novel, “is her writing,” and “in particular,” Dwight Garner notes in his Times 
review, “the book we are holding.” As much as “Heti” dwells on the idea of becoming a mother, 
she frets equally over the act of writing and, crucially, the idea of being “a writer.” If “Heti” is 
anything like the real-life Heti—celebrated, widely-reviewed, listed regularly among the law-
firm rundown of autofiction writers joked about by Folarin—which the novel heavily implies is 
the case, then “Heti’s” inability to ever experience real comfort in being what she certainly 
already is, “a real writer,” represents a legible depiction of the fraught proposal inherent in 
contemporary neoliberal subjectivity that the individually continually develop. This idea of 
“making oneself,” essential to a logic that demands continuous self-development, remains in 
Motherhood, like in HSAPB? before it, a major theme of the novel. The problem with the 
“making oneself” as demonstrated in Motherhood, I argue, is that its origin as an edict of the 
business firm that tasks the subject with continuous growth or increased profits renders it 
structurally unavailable for the individual subject.  
 Motherhood teems with characters in a state of beginning. There are several new mothers 
with whom “Heti” consults, such as friends Erica and Mairon, who feel old identities slipping 
away in favor of taking on the rewarding mantle of motherhood. “Heti’s” boyfriend Miles, in his 
late thirties, is beginning a long sought-after career as a lawyer. At the outset of the novel, we 
similarly find a “Heti” who “[has] for so long been putting off starting a new book,” but has 
several ideas in play (MH 10). As “Miles has begun working long hours,” “Heti” considers 
whether “to make a change and run off to New York and have fun” with her newfound alone 
time, “or to be a writer as [Miles] put it—as he reminded me that” she is (10). It’s clear that one 
source of Heti’s insecurity in her status as a writer is the extrinsic pressure to perform her own 
identity in keeping with the archetypical careerist author. Miles argues against “Heti’s” plan to 
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go to New York by asserting that “that once a writer starts to have an interesting life,” that is, 
once someone begins to enjoy the benefits of their status as a successful writer, “their writing 
always suffers” (11). Further, the question of motherhood is seen as the ultimate affront to this 
conception of the writer. In a dream sequence, “Heti” finds that her “breasts seemed to be the 
soggy breasts of an old woman” before “realiz[ing] they were not soggy breasts, but two flaccid 
penises” (133). “Heti” describes the dream to her friend Teresa, who tells her that “Breasts are 
what give life, while phalluses represent a creative or generative power—generating works of 
culture or art” (133). Theresa’s interpretation of the dream joins in with the neoliberal, careerist 
view that demands the artist hand themselves over completely to their craft, making any 
consideration of motherhood an undesirable impulse. Miles as well sees the demands of 
parenthood as incompatible with the lifestyle demanded by the artist, telling “Heti” “that one can 
either be a great artist and a mediocre parent, or the reverse, but not great at both, because both 
art and parenthood take all of one’s time and attention” (35). The dream “Heti'' symbolizes this 
dichotomous view in imagining her life-giving power as necessarily superseded by the 
generative power of the artist. But the dream, in depicting that generative power as flaccid, 
reveals what is ignored by the many outside voices that describe the writer-identity in terms of its 
career arc—"Heti” senses that the artistic drive is not one that can always be “on”—cannot 
always be stimulated—which frustrates the injunction of constant investment and improvement 
demanded of the neoliberal subject of capital. Artists are commonly understood to operate 
outside of the logic of commodity production and are idealized as those who create only in 
response to inspiration or some urgent political mandate.  
 The construction of “writer” that “Heti” identifies with is much closer to the inspired 
model of artist, one that has great privilege and responsibility in managing its freedom. It is also 
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a writer with great control over the performative power of its texts. Motherhood “will be a book 
to prevent future tears,” “Heti” announces (16). It will be a book 
to prevent me and my mother from crying. It can be called a success if, after 
reading it, my mother stops crying for good. I know it’s not the job of a child to 
stop her mother from crying, but I’m not a child anymore, I’m a writer. The 
change I have undergone, from child to writer, gives me powers—I mean that 
magical powers are not far from my hand. If I am a good enough writer, perhaps I 
can stop her from crying. Perhaps I can figure out why she is crying, and why I 
cry too, and I can heal us both with my words (16). 
While the writer has “powers,” “Heti” must remind herself that she needs to remain “grateful 
for” the opportunity to “follo[w] this tiniest thread of freedom, which is to write” (136). Being a 
writer is “all [she] ever truly wanted,” and she actively discourages herself from becoming 
covetous of financial security (136). “Don’t throw it away,” she tells herself, “chasing even more 
riches—more than what you’re owed. You are owed nothing, and what you do have—this 
expanse of freedom—do not gamble it away” (136). The tenuousness of her status and the fear 
that she’ll lose the right to claim “writer” as her identity seem to constantly occupy “Heti’s” 
thoughts. “Heti’s” experience as a neoliberal subject completely obviates capital accumulation as 
an attainable goal, making the careerism constantly promoted by Miles seem quaint, outmoded. 
However, as the structure of any neoliberal subjectivity requires some sense of progress or 
growth, what is accumulated instead is a closeness or affinity with what “Heti” already is—a 
legitimate writer. Accumulated, that is, until some setback comes along that seems to wipe out 
all progress, once again sparking her sense of guilt for not appreciating what she has been able to 
retain in an economic epoch that has resulted in “a significant increase in the number of 
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Americans experiencing downward mobility” (Rose). “Heti” reminds herself that she must “[b]e 
grateful for Miles, and this apartment right here, and being able to write” (136). “Just because 
you get one thing,” she reasons, “doesn’t mean you get it all” (136). 
 “Heti,” however, is forced to face her deep-seated feelings of class yearning thanks to her 
unexpected reacquaintance with Nicola, someone whom “Heti” “hadn’t seen since grade school” 
and runs into on the street (132). Nicola, a mother of four, is also herself in a state of beginning; 
she “is trying to return to the working world,” and one of the first things she does is to 
“congratulate [“Heti”] on the success of [her] latest book” (132). While Nicola seems to prize 
“Heti’s” critical and sales achievements, her recognition of that success sparks in “Heti” a 
realization that she spends almost all of her time working and sees very little financial reward in 
return. In answer to Nicola’s offering of congratulations, she returns “apologetically, Well, 
writing is the only thing I do. I don’t cook or do laundry, exercise or go out much. I just sit in my 
bed and write” (132) This makes her “feel like a weak and pale child compared to everyone else” 
(132). “Heti” allows herself to slip into that other, older capitalist guilt of not sufficiently 
enjoying life, finding that she “believes” she “want[s] to have adventures, or to breathe in the 
day, but that would leave less time for writing” (132). When the freedom and creativity of 
writing once “felt like more than enough,” she now likens herself to “a drug addict [...] missing 
out on life” in order to feed her habit (132). 
 She berates herself for falling into a fantasy, that “all the riches in the world were 
waiting” for her “when only one is—writing this now” (135). “How stupid” it was to believe she 
“could have what Nicola has; a marriage, a house and children” (134). She is beset with regret 
and guilt for feeling that anything was due to her other than a retention of her identity: “When 
did I start thinking of writing as the path to a bourgeois life? That it could get me there and keep 
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me there? When did I become so greedy? To be a thirty-eight-year-old woman and want to be 
respectable in all the ways Nicola is” (135). Nicola’s “respectability” is, of course, linked with 
the newly aspirational class signifiers of home ownership and being able to meet the costs of 
raising children. “Heti’s” desire for Nicola’s life is “misplaced,” so she learns to “[l]ook at her 
life like a beautiful ocean liner, a grand old steam liner passing by,” to “see that life as it waves 
at [her] from the deck” (135). She begins to think of her question “Should I?” as to whether or 
not to have a child as a misunderstanding of “the real question, Could [she]?” (135). “No,” she 
resolves, “you could not” (135). Here, merely entertaining of motherhood as a possible choice, 
the central question of the novel, is figured as a retrograde class yearning that gets misconstrued 
as a biological or cultural imperative. In the very next scene “Heti” dreams that she is graduating 
from an educational institution and finds that she “has tears in [her] eyes, [her] feelings start[ing] 
to overwhelm [her]” (137). The pride of accomplishment, however, is quickly undermined when 
she “really look[s] at the audience” and “realize[s] that no one [is] paying attention to [her]” 
(137). In that moment, she realizes that “it [is] silly to get so emotional about a rite of passage of 
the middle class” (137). Here, “Heti” is drawing a line connecting the rich affective connotations 
of motherhood with the affective dimension of the cultural middle-class existence even as it 
becomes too expensive for an increasing portion of the population.  
It’s notable that “Heti” deploys her awareness of the inanity of class yearning and the 
empty affectivity of class-specific cultural norms in order to convince herself, to justify, her 
lifelong sentence of endlessly receding from, and then working to reattain sameness with, what 
she already is—a writer. “Heti” feels that her work, far as it comes from providing financial 
security, is morally righteous as it is in service to “who [she] is inside,” that kernel of her “true” 
self that wants to be a writer above all else (135). Stripped of the profit motive, Heti’s neoliberal 
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rationality seeks progress circularly, receding from and then approaching the perfection of her 
writerly identity. To grow into more and other roles—mother, writer, artist, wife, member of the 
middle class—is an overreach, a “greediness,” in the sense that the expansion of responsibility 
cannot be squared with the efforts required to achieve sameness with just one of these roles. As 
“Heti” explains, limitation of expectations is not the same as outright self-denial, despite the fact 
that most of us are “miserly with ourselves when it comes to space and time” (169) “Having a 
child,” however, justifies “the impulse to give oneself nothing” by “mak[ing] that impulse into a 
virtue” (169). What makes motherhood so unappealing to a subject already oriented towards 
some other enterprise model is that it results in a moral imperative “to be virtuously miserly 
towards oneself in exchange for being loved,” and “having children gets you there fast” (169-
170). While one could easily imagine a neoliberal subjectivity that orients itself to “motherhood” 
as its enterprise model, undertaking a venture in which all activity is unified towards developing 
of the value of one’s children as a capital investment, “Heti” stubbornly persists with the 
decision made in HSAPB? to stick to the model of radically transparent autofictionalist that 
rendered her a competitive entity in the first place. 
Indeed, the “marketing” that Konstantinou sees as the signature function of autofiction is 
part and parcel of neoliberal subjectivity. But what must be accounted for is that the adherence to 
a financialized logic in the guidance of all activities, even those that seem to never result in the 
accrual of any profit or progress, means that the marketing must go on—even if it ends up 
costing money. “Heti” notes how, when returning from an extensive trip to Europe to market a 
novel, she makes the “mistake” of impulsively buying “Miles his favorite cologne at the airport 
in Amsterdam” (97). “This tour was so expensive,” she muses. “These tours always are” (97). 
Formalized promotional activities designed to increase Heti’s rank and profile as a writer and 
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expand her brand in other markets may in reality represent a net financial loss. Even if a writer 
were to reinvest all of their profits into expanding the sales of their next book, there is no 
guarantee that the amount of profit gained will outpace the outlays of the marketing spend, but 
the marketing is seen as an essential component to life as a writer.  
But “Heti” is not entirely helpless when it comes to enacting the edicts of neoliberal 
rationality. To an even higher degree than in HSAPB?, Motherhood is rife with methodological 
attempts to contest the reification of the neoliberal subjectivity that has placed “Heti” on the 
identity treadmill. One of these is the inclusion of a randomness-generating mechanism inspired 
by the I Ching, an ancient Chinese manual for accessing divine inspiration. The I Ching instructs 
users to toss a set of three coins six times, resulting in a value which corresponds to one of sixty-
four “hexagrams” which in turn form answers to questions the coin thrower can ask, usually with 
the purpose “discerning the pattern behind incessant changes” that seem to be part of life 
(“Philosophy of Change”). “Heti” adapts and simplifies this practice such that, in “flipping three 
coins on a desk,” a result of “[t]wo or three heads” returns an answer of “yes” and a result of 
“[t]wo or three tails” returns “no” (5). This opens her version of the coin flips to the answering 
of an unlimited field of possible yes or no questions, and her adherence to whatever answer the 
coins furnish provides a decision-making matrix that allows her “[t]o move away from the 
distortions of [her] mind and feel what actually is” (27). This coin-based method is similar to 
“Sheila’s” use of a tape recorder in HSAPB? which seeks to incorporate the cold mechanicality 
of verbatim transcription of conversations as “a way of getting out of [her] imagination” (La 
Force). The introduction of the coins as a disinterested mechanism for data processing in MH—
insofar as it remains beholden to responding to whatever interest is embedded in the questions 
being asked— allows for the emergence of a logic not driven by neoliberal rationales. It also, 
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somewhat ingeniously, produces the effect of an agential interlocutor, further heightened by the 
novel’s status as autofiction and the pre-title page paratextual note which asserts that, “[i]n this 
book, all results from the flipping of coins result from the flipping of actual coins.” “Heti’s” 
frequent consultation of the coins provides some of the novel’s most memorable and humorous 
scenes, such as when the coins lead “Heti” to place a large plastic kitchen knife on her dresser as 
the talisman of the “demon-angel” that “brings [her] bad dreams” (57).  
Motherhood is also notable in its complete rejection of growth narratives, achieved in 
part by its depiction of “Heti’s” definancialized neoliberal subjectivity as a cyclical retreat from 
and approach to what she already is. But the novel's status as autofiction gives it additional 
license to flout traditional plot structure via the mechanism of confessionalism, allowing 
antidepressant medication, initially pursued by “Heti” as a palliative for PMS symptoms, to serve 
as the resolving force that quiets her inner conflicts. Towards the end of the novel, “Heti” 
becomes increasingly unable to function within her relationship, and she feels no closer to being 
comfortable with her writing practice or coming to a final decision about whether or not to have 
children. She even loses faith in her coins, deciding that “[r]andomness is useless and leads 
nowhere” and that “[i]t is better to believe nothing than to believe things randomly and 
haphazardly” (191). Her emotional turmoil is such that she reaches the point of accepting 
whatever rationality presides, since one needs “to have a foundation from which to rule one’s 
behavior and life” rather “than this randomness and haphazardness, which leads as much to 
absurdity as it does to anything true” (191-192). However, one night, before falling asleep, she 
suddenly hears a voice that tells her “You need to control yourself if you are to have more 
meaning in your life” (207). While this certainly sounds like a typical neoliberal edict, it prompts 
the realization that “the pain” one is given should be “only as much as you can handle—like a 
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glass of water filled to the brim, the water hovering at the meniscus, not running over” (208). 
“The question” she realizes she needs to be asking “is, Is what I am suffering characteristic?” 
(209). As she explains, “Some suffering feels characteristic, it’s deep and familiar in your bones” 
(209). “Other suffering,” though, “feels alien, like it should not be happening to you” (209). 
While she initially attributes the unrelenting anxiety and sadness that permeates the later portions 
of Motherhood to acute PMS, whatever the root cause of the problem, the antidepressants work 
extremely well. Suddenly, she no longer chafes inside of her relationship, even asking Miles at 
one point, “Are you always this nice to me?” In return, “He sa[ys], Yes” (240). She also finds 
that, in a moment of decision, she is effectively unconflicted about her desire to not have a child, 
even seeking out the morning after pill after having unprotected sex with Miles. The central 
source of internal conflict in the novel suddenly loses its bite. The efficacy of the medication 
suggests that the pain might indeed “alien” in the sense that it is the result of some biological 
imbalance, a strictly medical issue that is successfully treated. The pain is not “characteristic” of 
a body working as it should. But the logic of her suffering, is, I argue, “characteristic” of her 
subjectivity  
“Heti” realizes immediately the implications that her successfully receiving treatment for 
depression has for her novel. “What kind of story is it when a person goes down, down, down 
and down—but instead of breaking through and seeing the truth and ascending, they go down, 
then they take drugs, and then they go up? I don’t know what kind of story that is,” she thinks 
(243). She is also left to question all of her past obsessions, including that radically transparent 
model of writer adopted as the resolution of HSAPB?. “I had wanted to think about the world,” 
she thinks, “but my anxieties forced me to think about myself—as if pressing into my face an 
injunction: first you must solve this problem—the problem of yourself” (241). In turning the self 
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into the unavoidable problem to be solved, the figure of the “alien pain” of her depression begins 
to seem inseparable from that of neoliberal rationality. Once the pain is gone, whether purely 
medical or not, Sheila’s need to always either live a life more in keeping with the figure of the 
writer as understood by the abiding cultural narrative or to work harder in the model of the 
careerist writer simply melts away. She instead is left with “[t]he feeling that there is little in life 
left to strive for; something having been accomplished, not much left to do. A feeling of 
uselessness, of the end of the world coming, of other’s people’s lives having no purpose, of all of 
us doing whatever we feel like, no collective direction in which we’re all taking part” (264). 
While Sheila’s closing sensation of purposelessness lacks any of the intentionality associated 
with narrative, she is finally free of the logic of enterprise that turns angst into ambience and 
makes an expectation of continuous progression into a source of unlimited failure. At the end of 
her novel, she “can’t pretend” she has “come to any answers, or any great wisdom” that needs to 
be shared (242). Even the central question of becoming a mother becomes irrelevant as the 
character ages past its relevance, and the novel quietly ends.  
Does the character, left without anything to strive for, simply cease existing? The answer 
is of course yes. The novel ends: the text is finite. But the charge of Motherhood refuses to 
dissipate so readily. The reader, knowing Motherhood to be a work of autofiction, is unable to 
experience the fictionalized character of Sheila without calling up her double: the real-life author 
Sheila Heti. The autofictional novel may end, but the author lingers as the author-character’s 
ghostly after-image, though unleashed from the text, free to move about and act in our world. It’s 
true that this effect rewards engagement with subsequent products: new books, movie 
adaptations, author talks, interviews, blogs. The author gains viability as a suite of related 
experiences under the banner of a single brand. We want to solve the puzzle of the fact/fiction 
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divide: Is Heti OK? Did she really take antidepressants? How long did it take to flip all those 
coins? But the effect achieved by autofiction is not limited to its development of brand loyalty. 
Just as Sheila reminds us of the reality of Sheila Heti, the fact of Sheila Heti forces us to face the 
fictionality of Sheila. We have no choice but to reckon with her as a construction. As such, the 
rendering of the insuperable dilemma of neoliberal subjectivity in a fictionalized version of 
herself teaches us that, at the very least, it’s possible to know you’re in the neoliberal trap, on the 
identity treadmill. Sheila Heti’s persistence despite the character Sheila’s obsolescence at the end 
of narrative becomes a figure for the possibility of getting out, getting off the treadmill.  
Autofiction as parasitic self-invention in Forest Dark  
Nicole Krauss’s fourth novel, Forest Dark (2017), consists of two separate narratives 
following thematically parallel tracks in alternating sections of the book. One of the stories, 
written in the third person, follows the parable-like tale of Jules Epstein, a wealthy New York 
lawyer who, having “caught the disease of radical charity” following his divorce, begins to 
systematically divest himself of his assets and travels to Tel Aviv, the place of his birth (Krauss 
11). The other thread, written in the first-person, follows an author named Nicole who travels to 
Israel to revisit the architecturally brutalist Tel Aviv Hilton resort, a perennial vacation-stay of 
her childhood, before being looped into a surreal conspiracy involving the papers of Franz 
Kafka. While Epstein’s story conforms to the conventions of novelistic fiction, critics have 
keyed on the shared first name and the biographical similarities between Krauss and the novel’s 
Nicole, whose first-person narration is “characterized by the meandering intimacy of 
contemporary autofiction” (Clark). While the novel’s plot calls readers to question to what extent 
the Nicole sections are strictly autobiographical, the critical consensus is that this portion of the 
work is indeed autofictional (Clark, Lorentzen, Silman). However, autofiction’s role in Forest 
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Dark is not limited to its deployment as one of two distinct modes of narration. Autofiction as a 
practice becomes an object of scrutiny in both of Forest Dark’s narratives, which coalesce to 
form a meditation on autofiction’s potency as a tool for characterological self-fashioning.  
While Epstein returns to Israel to feel closer to a sense of home, Nicole is drawn to the 
Tel Aviv Hilton by a confluence of desires, impulses, and an odd request. The first of Nicole’s 
reasons to travel to Tel Aviv happens to be in service of one of the core tropes of autofiction: 
metafiction. Suffering from years of writer’s block, Nicole is drawn by a hunch that the Hilton 
will provide an access point to finally beginning her next novel. If she were “going to write a 
novel about the Hilton, or modeled on the Hilton, or even razing the Hilton to the ground, then it 
made sense,” she thought, “that the obvious place to finally begin writing was at the actual 
Hilton itself” (Krauss 64). The second reason she goes to Israel is to get the perspective of 
distance on her “failing marriage,” which fulfills another core convention of autofiction: 
confessionalism (42). Critics note that Nicole’s marriage problems are at least partially a 
reflection of Krauss’s real life 2014 divorce, “a public split with fellow writer Jonathan Safran 
Foer” that became a source of public speculation thanks to rumors that Foer had attempted (and 
failed) to enter into a relationship with actress Natalie Portman (Silman, Loomes). But third, and 
most importantly for the plot, Nicole is informed by her father’s cousin, Effie, that one Eliezer 
Friedman—an old colleague of Effie’s at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who went on to 
“bec[o]me a professor of literature at the university in Tel Aviv” but “never gave up his ties to 
the Mossad”—wanted to meet with her, implying that it concerned something of grave 
importance (60). This is where the fictional meets the autobiographical, propelling Nicole on a 
journey that will lead her to eventually being abandoned in an IDF safe house in the remote 
Israeli countryside, starving to death with Friedman’s dog while persistently transfixed by an 
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unopened, beat-up suitcase purported to contain a trove of undiscovered papers belonging to 
Franz Kafka. 
One of the conundrums that Forest Dark presents is how to make sense of the pairing of 
the two seemingly unconnected, alternating threads of the novel. Many note similarities between 
the two characters’ plot arcs. Reviewer Heller McAlpin describes Epstein and Nicole as “two 
strivers [...] [u]nable to find consolation in their usual outlets” of “love, wealth and power,” or 
“writing,” and thus “head, impulsively and compulsively, to the Tel Aviv Hilton, an important 
landmark in both their lives.” Additionally, he notes that each “fal[l] under the spell of a scruffy 
mentor who promises to take them to higher spiritual realms” once they get there (McAlpin). The 
stories, however, “run on parallel tracks, never intersecting,” running counter to a tendency in 
contemporary fiction that any multiplicity of plot lines or narrators inevitably come together 
(McAlpin). Forest Dark’s alternating sections are so seemingly disconnected that one reviewer 
felt that the book isn’t a novel but “really two novellas,” only “connected by the theme of 
questing for meaning” (Zimmerman). There is, however, one connection between Nicole and 
Epstein that seems to have escaped notice: Nicole’s story is autofiction; Epstein’s story results 
from a response to autofiction. 
The opening chapter, which focuses on the origins of Epstein’s change from wealthy 
lawyer to spiritual seeker, tells us that Epstein’s project to systematically divest himself of 
wealth “had begun with a book” given to him by his youngest daughter, Maya (Krauss 11). 
“[T]he little autobiographical book, the testament of a man alone facing God” was written “by an 
Israeli poet, Polish-born,” when its author “was only twenty-seven” (11) The book “had 
overwhelmed” Epstein, who feels himself shrink in comparison with the precociously wise 
author. As he explains, when Epstein was “twenty-seven, he himself had been blinded by his 
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ambition and appetite—for success, for money, for sex, for beauty, for love” (11). His reading 
prompts Epstein to ask, “What might his life have been if he had applied himself with the same 
intensity to the spiritual realm? Why had he closed himself off from it so completely?” (11). The 
book that had such a drastic impact on Epstein correlates with Pinchas Sadeh’s Life as a Parable 
(1958),4 likewise written when its Polish-born, Israeli-poet author was twenty-seven and 
similarly a testament that “man is alone within God, that he is part of a vague cosmic dream” 
(Katz 159). Sadeh, who “was born in Lemberg, Poland, in 1929, and immigrated to Palestine 
with his parents in 1934,” in part “attain[ed] the status he achieved” thanks to the success of Life 
as a Parable, an “autobiographical novel” that became “one of the first cult-books in Israeli 
culture” (Katz 160). Life as a Parable is perhaps most noted today for the fanatical response it 
evoked in readers, who identified fiercely with the author and caused him, “[f]or a few decades” 
at least, to be “revered as something of a guru” (Izikovich). Sadeh’s “unusual novel,” provoked a 
dedicated following as he “became, both on account of his writing and his sequestered, self-
dramatized way of life, an idol for young Israelis and would-be artists” (Feinberg). 
Flagged initially by Epstein’s response to a book that undoubtedly refers to Life as a 
Parable, Sadeh’s presence, once detected, seems to announce itself continuously throughout 
Forest Dark. For one, Epstein’s entire journey is spurred by his response to a novel that would 
probably be considered autofiction had it been published today. Life as a Parable is said to 
“foreshado[w] Expressionistic principles,” seen throughout Sadeh’s oeuvre, “mainly, the work of 
art as a cry of protest and an expression of the self” (Feinberg). Written “in confessional style,” 
 
4 Pinchas Sadeh, first name variously spelled Pinhas or Pinḥas in English transliteration, 
is the author of twenty-one books published in Hebrew, including poetry collections, 
novels, novellas, and children’s books. Only two of his works are available in translation 
in English, including 1966 and 1989 editions of Life as a Parable and 1989 and 1990 
editions of Jewish Folktales, an anthology of folk legends from both European and 
eastern contexts “selected and retold” by Sadeh.  
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Sadeh’s novel “interweav[es] reflections and meditations on human existence and nature with 
personal experiences” (Feinberg). This description of the book could easily be reapplied to Heti’s 
Motherhood or the portions of Forest Dark narrated by Nicole, but Sadeh’s influence on 
Nicole’s story reaches further than the shared autofictional mode of narration. The conflict of 
opinion that arises between Nicole and Eliezer Friedman is in many ways an articulation of a 
debate in Israeli intellectual life that many see originating with Sadeh’s introduction of a 
“rejection of the ubiquitous collective experience in favor of far-reaching individualism” into the 
discursive field (Feinberg). 
Friedman, as it turns out, invites Nicole to Israel for the express purpose of entrusting her 
with a uniquely dubious literary task: to furnish an ending to a script for “a play that Kafka wrote 
near the end of his life” so that it may be made into a film (89). Additionally, he would also like 
her to take charge of sorting through and cataloguing the contents of a mysterious suitcase, once 
owned by Kafka’s confidant Max Brod, that by quirks of inheritance law has become the private 
property of an Israeli citizen, Esther Hoffe (88). The details reported in the book about the 
suitcase mirror the real-life suit in which a suitcase thought to contain “drawings, travel diaries, 
letters and drafts” by Kafka fell into the private ownership of a Tel Aviv family, resulting in 
“more than 50 years of legal wrangling” between the National Library of Israel and the estate of 
Esther Hoffe (Batuman). This kernel of reality, by effect of its treatment in autofiction, raises the 
possibility that someone really did approach Krauss (or somebody else) about working with the 
contents of the suitcase in an artistically dubious manner—which is of course unlikely, but the 
charge of that possibility is inherent to the playful negotiation that the novel asks its readers to 
perform between credulity and incredulity.  
While the novel certainly delights in toying with the plausibility of its implausible plot, 
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Forest Dark is equally concerned with discussing the implications of writing in relation to 
questions of what role it plays in the forging of national—and personal—identity. Here is where 
Sadeh’s philosophy and “indifference to the destiny of Israeli society” as espoused in Life as a 
Parable reenters the frame, now reflected in Nicole’s insistence contra Friedman that her writing 
cannot be beholden to the interest of the nation (Katz 161). Friedman, in making the case to 
Nicole as to why it is her duty to take custody of Kafka’s papers, articulates a conception of 
identification with the nation over and beyond one’s individual identity as a discrete agent in 
pursuit of only self-development. Though “[w]riters work alone,” Friedman tells Nicole, “when 
they are guided naturally toward certain themes—when their instincts and our goals converge in 
a common interest—one can give them opportunities” (Krauss 84). Nicole interprets this 
justification to finish Kafka’s play as a mission “[t]o cast Jewish experience in a certain light” or 
“to put a spin on it in order to influence how [Jewish people] are seen” (84). “Sounds to me more 
like PR than literature,” she says (84). This disagreement between Nicole and Friedman 
rehearses an ongoing debate among contemporary “Israeli intellectuals unwilling or unable to 
simply accept the Orthodox form of Judaism” (Katz 172). Though they all similarly “struggl[e] 
to define their Jewish identity and its place in Israel,” the intellectual class has adopted different 
approaches to the problem (Katz 172). The first approach, according to Gideon Katz, “can be 
summarized as ‘Judaism as culture,’” a view in which “the entire spectrum of contents that are 
unique to the Jewish people are perceived as the Jews’ own creation” (172). As Katz describes it, 
In Israel, this approach is characterized by the presence of a certain national 
tone—Jewish creations, i.e., works that were created by Jews, are the property of 
the nation. The people voicing this view strive to provide a literary or a 
philosophical interpretation to religious contents, thereby accounting for or 
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strengthening their affinity with or their ownership over them (172).  
This is the view represented by the ex-Literature Professor Eliezer Friedman in Forest Dark, 
who likewise understands Jewish identity as inscribed in important texts, thus rendering those 
texts collective property. “You think your writing belongs to you?” Friedman asks Nicole after 
proposing she finish Kafka’s play (125). “Who else?” She responds. “To the Jews,” he says, to 
which Nicole “[breaks] into laughter” (125). He further reveals his sense that writing isn’t just 
about crafting a certain perception among outsiders, but can be performative in the sense of 
writing collective identity into existence:  
You’re looking at it too narrowly. What we’re talking about is much larger than 
perception. It’s the idea of self-invention. Event, time, experience: these are the 
things that happen to us. One can look at the history of mankind as a progression 
from extreme passivity—daily life as an immediate response to drought, cold, 
hunger, physical urges, without a sense of past or future—to a greater and greater 
exercise of will and control over our lives and our destiny. In that paradigm, the 
development of writing represented a huge leap. When the Jews began to 
compose the central texts on which their identity would be founded, they were 
enacting that will, consciously defining themselves—inventing themselves—as no 
one had before (84-85).  
In this view, the totality of Jewish literature is essentially writing the same text: Jewish Identity. 
The act of narration then becomes the delineation of a single thread of a collective experience, 
woven together in the intertext of the closed social body.   
An opposing approach, as described by Katz, is the one represented by Sadeh, who 
“relinquishes the collective aspect of Judaism in order not to harm its ability to serve the 
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individual,” a position Katz terms “Spiritual Judaism” (174). Likewise, Nicole rejects any 
injunction to write on behalf of the nation of Israel or the Jewish diaspora. She instead adopts the 
view of Sadeh, who “strongly emphasizes the difference between man’s lonely and authentic 
existence facing God, and life in society and, to a large extent, in the world as we know it in 
general” (159). But clearly, she is not alone, as “Sadeh’s religious ideas” have become widely 
adopted, and their “attractiveness […] for contemporary Israeli culture stems from their 
individualistic leaning” (174). The implication, of course, is that the subjectivity called in 
contemporary culture rewards individualism, and Sadeh’s ideas arrive at the kairotic moment for 
maximum impact. Nicole, though she internalizes Friedman’s de-essentialized notion of identity 
which avails the collective self for manipulation by cultural agents, adopts Sadeh’s logic of 
reserve in the formation of her self-identity through the performative action of her writing, 
rejecting any responsibility of developing communal identity alongside her own.  
Sadeh’s philosophy of individual religiosity is a good case study of the way that 
neoliberalism, far from dispensing with all forms of collectivity, instead flips the paradigm of the 
individual’s relationship to that collective such that it is the individual that benefits from the 
strength of the collective. As Smith writes, “Neoliberal society requires and encourages 
engagement with others,” however “these forms of association are largely understood to lead to 
the enrichment of the self” (6). If neoliberal capitalists privatize the state, then it can be said that 
Sadeh privatizes theology, reversing the target of its enrichment from the social container to the 
development of social body as a field of individuals. Krauss’s embedding of Life as a Parable 
into Forest Dark also problematizes autofiction as a modality of narration that can seductively 
spin a false narrative that sells, for instance, the promise of full self-actualization. Epstein’s 
response to Life as a Parable is one example of this misuse of the power of the fictionalized self. 
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While the book does inspire Epstein to change, it is a change motivated by the deep inadequacy 
that arises from his self-comparison with the young Sadeh, setting Epstein off on another venture 
of competition in his long life of winning and succeeding. Though goal of profit accrual is 
replaced by its obverse, Epstein still frames a life-story enunciated by the financial logic of 
growth—growth of the spirit, of wisdom, of inner-peace. After reading the book, Epstein “began 
to bestow with the same ferocity with which he had once acquired” (9). His disavowal of his 
former self is driven by “an irresistible longing for lightness[,] […] a quality, he realize[s] only 
now, that had been alien to him all his life” (10). Then, “after nearly a year of chipping away at 
the accumulations of a lifetime,” he reaches what he believes to be “the bottommost layer”: his 
parents (12). Here the boundaries of self extend impossibly into the past, into the lives of others.  
He shifts his spending to charitable contributions that exact the return of memorialization of his 
parents. Beginning with a bench in a small Florida park, these gestures appreciate in scale and 
emotional inadequacy until Epstein funds the planting of a new forest in the northern Negev 
desert and promises to bankroll a film that he is, unknown to him, unable to pay for.  
Characterological self-fashioning via autofiction is one of the potencies of autofiction, 
and it is this feature that motivates the association of autofiction with marketing. “This is the first 
time,” Lorentzen writes in his review of Forest Dark, “I’ve come across a work of autofiction 
that’s at heart an elaborate project of self-flattery.” He reads the novel’s juxtaposition of Epstein 
and Nicole as an implicit judgment of Epstein’s spiritual flailing, unprincipled giving, and the 
fact that he “abandons his family and disappears completely” in search of himself (“Krauss’s 
Forest Dark”). “Nicole,” on the other hand, “doesn’t quite go all the way” and returns to her 
children, which Lorentzen argues constitutes a stance of self-congratulation (“Krauss’s Forest 
Dark”). While, in my estimation Lorentzen is too committed to reviewing the novel negatively, 
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he does identify Forest Dark’s concern with how autofiction traverses the text/real-world divide. 
The real difference between Krauss and Sadeh’s autofictions is that Sadeh opportunistically 
benefitted from the fantasy of absolute self-possession erected in his fictional persona. Sadeh’s 
numberous relationships with young women seeking to inhabit that way of life came to be the 
source of public scandal, as these relationships “almost always ended badly” (Izikovich). Krauss, 
on the other hand, in continuously raising the implausibility of her plot, takes up an ethical stance 
on the limits of self-fiction, disabusing readers of any impression that the events in the novel 
“actually happened.”  
Further, Krauss warns readers that the textual self that narrates the novel is something 
altogether different from the Nicole Krauss writing the novel. In the final scene, Nicole returns 
home to Brooklyn to find that the “lights were on inside our house. Through the front window I 
could see my children playing on the floor, heads bent over a game. They didn’t see me. And for 
a while I didn’t see myself either, sitting in a chair in the corner, already there” (294). Nicole’s 
uncanny intrusion into her own domestic scene indicates the incommensurability of the 
fictionalized author-character and the author, separated ontologically by the divergence of 
temporal states inhabited by writer and the written. At the climax of Nicole’s story, just moments 
before she resolves to escape the desert safehouse and return to her family, she finally 
understands how she would have liked to have responded to Friedman’s request that she 
complete Kafka’s play on behalf of the Jewish people. She writes: “Only now that he was gone 
was I ready to argue with him, to tell him that literature could never be employed by Zionism, 
since Zionism is predicated on an end—of the Diaspora, of the past, of the Jewish problem—
whereas literature resides in the sphere of the endless, and those who write have no hope of an 
end” (269). The writer, subjectivized by neoliberalism, orients her activity to the “endlessness” 
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of productivity, of overcoming crises, of finding material, of being a writer. As Brown puts it, in 
neoliberalism “[p]roductivity is prioritized over product,” and “enterprise is prioritized over 
consumption or satisfaction” (65-66). This reorientation of economic rationality, in the case of 
the novel, hinges on the centering of the author in the literary act, who must continue to inscribe 
herself into existence, putting to record, by sheer fictional invention if necessary, what a stable 
reality, facts, communal identity, and history cannot do on her behalf: justify her existence and 
call into being her activity. However, Krauss’s explicit fragmentation of the narrating-self calls 
attention to the impossibility of enjoining the finitude of the novel with the endless horizon of 
growth presupposed in financialized subjectivity.   
Conclusion: autofiction without the self 
Wendy Brown, in critiquing the limits of Foucault’s conceptualization of neoliberalism, 
asserts that it is crucial to account for the way that “capital circulates certain truths to sustain its 
power as well as its legitimacy, or better, to sustain its legitimacy as power” (75). The focus of 
her project in Undoing the Demos is to uncover the ways that the “neoliberal triumph of homo 
oeconomicus as the exhaustive figure of the human is undermining democratic practices” (79).  
The nation-state, in identifying itself with “the imperative of cheapening labor and expanding 
markets, the imperative of economic growth, the imperative of constant renovations in 
production […] to generate profit, and so forth” has necessitated atomized consensus building at 
the level of the individual (75). What autofiction adds to this discussion, I argue, is the way it 
reveals self-narration as a technique for both legitimizing and contesting this rationality of 
governance. All three of the author characters of HSAPB?, Motherhood, and Forest Dark 
experience crisis and attempt to use the self-narration afforded by autofiction to regulate their 
subjective relations to their identities. But each of the three novels also complicate this notion, 
 
48 
ending on notes of ambivalence that are run-through with the capacity to refuse a logic that 
equates narrative continuance with progression and growth. Sheila finds she’s entered a 
competitive field where nobody knows the rules, a chain of signification whose nodal point is the 
competition itself. “Heti” writes an autofiction that has a deeply unsatisfying ending—deus ex 
machina by psychiatry, halting “progress” despite the continuance of narrative. Nicole arrives 
home and finds that she’s already in the room, playing with her own children, while the Nicole 
of the novel that keys on endlessness as the domain of the writer is found to be something else, a 
fragment of the self intruding into reality. In all three novels, the subject of self-construction that 
is called for by neoliberalism is a site of failure. As the texts end in ambivalence, the author 
having long since retreated to write something else, what’s left is a trace of the contaminant 
around which the subject of neoliberalism coalesces. Having been given a sample, readers can 
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